In a former paper [Fluct. Noise Lett., 13 (2014) 1450020] we introduced a vehicular communication system with unconditionally secure key exchange based on the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) key distribution scheme. In this paper, we address the secure KLJN key donation to vehicles. This KLJN key donation solution is performed lane-by-lane by using roadside key provider equipment embedded in the pavement. A method to compute the lifetime of the KLJN key is also given. This key lifetime depends on the car density and gives an upper limit of the lifetime of the KLJN key for vehicular communication networks.
Introduction
After more than 100 years of development on modern vehicle technology, we are on our way to smarter cars and much more intelligent transportation systems. Nowadays, people pay more attention to safety and comfort in vehicles, rather than traditional traction ability, fuel cost, handling, and stability. Therefore, it is believed that safety transmitted securely to avoid malicious activities. The private financial information used in toll collection when cars pass by RSDs also needs to be protected.
In order to solve these fundamental security-related issues for promising vehicular communication network applications, several security protocols have been proposed by different researchers. In [10] [11] , the authors proposed a security infrastructure that is based on public key infrastructure (PKI). Later, other solutions based on PKI were proposed [2, 4, 12, 13] . The authors of [2] provided a "lightweight" authenticated key scheme that integrates blind signature techniques for V2V and V2RSD communications. In [4] , the authors presented an approach that combines the traditional PKI and identity-based public key cryptography for vehicular communication networks. In [12] , a secure scheme with session keys (pairwise and group keys) used in non-safety-related applications (e.g. "chatting in platoon") was designed. In [13] , temporary anonymous certified keys (TACKs) were constructed, and a key management scheme based on TACKs was proposed for vehicular communication networks. Besides PKI, group signatures are another important category of proposed security methods. Based on the strong Diffie-Hellmanand linear assumptions, the authors of [14] introduced the under-200 bytes group signature scheme that has a similar security level to the RSA (Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman public-key cryptosystem) signature of the same length.
A group signature-based protocol using tamper-resistance devices and a probabilistic signature verification scheme was proposed in [3] . In [15] , the authors constructed an identity-based batch verification scheme for V2RSD communication in vehicular communication networks. In [16] , a software-based roadside unit-aided messages authentication protocol for V2V communications was proposed. In addition, a software-based solution that uses secure and privacy enhancing communication schemes for vehicular sensor networks was provided in [17] .
On KLJN-based secure key distribution in vehicular communication networks 4 Most of the above security schemes or protocols are constructed based on software encryption mechanisms. The security on these software-based methods is based on the premise that the eavesdroppers have limited computational power. Thus, these security schemes offer just a computationally conditional security [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] . Moreover, these architectures focus their attention on V2V or V2RSD communications and although there is significant information transmitted in the Roadside-Device-to-Certification-Authority (RSD2CA) communication [9] , it is very rare to find works related to securing this particular communication channel.
In 
On the KLJN key exchange
The illustration of the ideal KLJN key exchange scheme is shown in Fig. 2 [19, [21] [22] [23] [24] . 
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The Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key exchange scheme was proposed in 2005 [19] as a statistical/physical competitor to quantum key distribution (QKD) [20] . The KLJN scheme provides unconditional security based on the Kirchhoff's loop law of quasi-static electrodynamics and the fluctuation-dissipation theorem [19, [21] [22] [23] [24] ; for a general security proof, see [25] . Several potential applications have been proposed such as: classical networks [26] , smart power grids [27] , and secure computers, algorithms, and hardware [28] .
In this ideal KLJN scheme, the two communicating parties, Alice , ( ) or , ( ), respectively) and connect them to the wireline. The possible permutations of the resistors connected to the channel will be: , , , and . In the cases of or , the location of the resistors and the exchanged bits are publicly known, thus these bits are discarded [19] . On the other hand, and are secure bit exchange situations, because Eve cannot differentiate between the situations and .
The security of the ideal KLJN scheme is based on the second law of thermodynamics [19, [21] [22] [23] [24] , that is the difficulty to crack the ideal KLJN system is similar to that of to build a perpetual-motion machine of the second kind. In addition, the KLJN system is robust and not sensitive to vibrations [24] , and is easy to be integrated on chips [28] . Based on the above core scheme, some advanced schemes were proposed to enhance the speed of the KLJN system [23] .
In order to protect against active (invasive) attacks (and also against passive attacks on non-ideal systems), the KLJN system continuously monitors or measures the instantaneous current and voltage at the two ends of the line [22] . These measurements are compared via an authenticated public channel. Therefore, any intruder causing changes in the circuitry, and thus affecting the instantaneous measurements, will cause an alarm to go off and Alice and Bob will discover the intrusion. This defense mechanism is illustrated in Fig. 3 . It is important to note that the instantaneous current and voltage data contain all the information related to the key that Eve could have. Thus, it is impossible for Eve to extract key information without letting the system know of such activity. In consequence, Alice and Bob can decide whether or not to discard the compromised bits according to a previously agreed maximum allowed level of information leak toward Eve [22] .
According to the working principle of the KLJN scheme, the secure bit exchange takes place when the resistor states of the two communicators (i.e., the CA and RSD and/or RSKP in vehicular communication networks) are different, i.e., or .This is indicated by an intermediate level of the mean-square noise voltage ( ) on the line, or that of the noise current in the wire [19] . This concept is shown in Fig. 4 . 
It is important to mention that the two communication parties must previously and publicly agree on which one of them will invert the exchanged bit to have identical keys at the two ends.
KLJN Secure Key in Vehicular Communication Networks
Based on the working principle of the KLJN scheme [19] and the vehicular communication network model with unconditional secure key exchange proposed in [9] , we discuss the generation, donation, and lifetime of the KLJN secure key in vehicular communication networks.
KLJN key generation in vehicular communication networks
According to the vehicular communication network model with unconditional secure key distribution proposed in [9] , there is a KLJN line connecting the Certification Authority (CA) to the Roadside Devices (RSDs) and Roadside Key Providers (RSKP) (see Fig. 5 ). ii). The RSKP will use the extra wire (i.e., the high speed communication line) to inform the CA in charge about the key request.
iii). A key generation process will take place between the RSKP and the CA.
iv). The RSKP will then provide the cars with the unconditional secure keys by using a near field communication wireless technology [9] . 
KLJN key donation in vehicular communication networks
It is important to mention that the RSKP key donation that was proposed in [9] , where RSKPs were visualized as gates, might not be as efficient as expected. This is because vehicles would have to slow down in order to get sufficiently close to the RSKPs (as proximity is needed for secure key donation). Therefore, we also propose a lane-by-lane key donation using RSKP equipment embedded in the pavement. In this way, vehicles will not have to slow down to obtain their keys. To detect vehicles in each lane, either loop detectors [29] or high-definition digital wave radars [30] deployed on the side of the roadway can be used. Both the RSKPs and the radar units can be connected to RSDs through a high speed wireline connection. Thus, the KLJN key generation is performed between RSDs and the CA only, while the RSKP will be only in charge of providing the cars with the unconditionally secure KLJN keys. Moreover, this key donation process would be encrypted with the former key, therefore, even if an eavesdropper is listening, he/she would not be able to extract the key information unless he/she has the former key. Figure 6 illustrates this solution. 
Upper limit of the KLJN key lifetime
The lifetime of the KLJN key in vehicular communication networks is a very important technical parameter that needs to be discussed. This is because the longer the KLJN key is used, the more susceptible it is to attacks. In order to find out the lifetime of the KLJN key in vehicular communication networks, we proceed as follows.
First of all, the noise bandwidth is determined by the distance between the two communicating parties, which in the case of vehicular communication networks depends on the length of the KLJN line segment between RSDs and the CA. Thus, the following relationship must be satisfied [19] : ≪ , where is the speed of electromagnetic waves in the wireline. Suppose that 0 < Θ ≪ 1 and the noise bandwidth is:
Also, the duration of the bit sharing period must be long enough compared to the correlation time of the noise , i.e., ≈ 1 , in order to correctly distinguish between the different resistors situations [31, 32] . The frequency of secure bit exchange is:
where ≫ 1, see [31, 32] and the factor 1 2 is due to the fact that a secure bit exchange occurs (on average) 50% of the time.
The lifetime of the KLJN key in vehicular communication networks depends on the vehicle density. For the sake of simplicity, first we assume homogenous car density:
where is the number of cars and is the number of Roadside Devices with KLJN units. Thus, a KLJN unit serves cars. Consequently, the frequency of secure bit donation to a single car is:
If the length of the KLJN key is defined as , then by combining Eqs. (1)- (4), we find that the lifetime of the KLJN key in vehicular communication networks is:
Note that this result represents a pessimistic estimation for inhomogeneous ve- is the "no-wave limit" condition [22] ). Then the lifetime of KLJN key is = 10 3 .
Techniques such as building parallel channels by using chip and multi-wire cables can be used to enhance the speed of the KLJN scheme and to decrease [19] . There is also a possibility to increase the security of physically exchanged keys in the case of repeated usage [33] .
Conclusion
In this paper, we reviewed the communication infrastructure and discussed some se- 
